COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH INFORMATION SHARING

[1] INFORMATIONAL PROPERTIES OF NASH SOLUTIONS OF 2 STOCHASTIC NONZERO-SUM GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 7 (04) : 370 - 387

[2] CLARKE R, 1985, EPO851 US DEP JUST A

[3] COLLUSION AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 383 - 394

[4] ERICSON WA, 1969, J ROY STAT SOC B, V31, P332

[5] INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (02) : 329 - 343

[6] GALOR E, 1984, UNPUB REV EC STUDIES

[7] LI L, 1985, CALTECH563 SOC SCI W

[8] FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS COURNOT DUOPOLY WITH INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND RELEASE [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (01): : 214 - 218

[9] PALFREY T, 1985, REV EC STUDIES, V52

[10] SHAPIRO C, 1984, 74 PRINC U W WILS SC

[1] INFORMATIONAL PROPERTIES OF NASH SOLUTIONS OF 2 STOCHASTIC NONZERO-SUM GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1974, 7 (04) : 370 - 387

[2] CLARKE R, 1985, EPO851 US DEP JUST A

[3] COLLUSION AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 383 - 394

[4] ERICSON WA, 1969, J ROY STAT SOC B, V31, P332

[5] INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (02) : 329 - 343

[6] GALOR E, 1984, UNPUB REV EC STUDIES

[7] LI L, 1985, CALTECH563 SOC SCI W

[8] FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS COURNOT DUOPOLY WITH INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND RELEASE [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (01): : 214 - 218

[9] PALFREY T, 1985, REV EC STUDIES, V52

[10] SHAPIRO C, 1984, 74 PRINC U W WILS SC