NASH AND PERFECT EQUILIBRIA OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES

被引：12

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

MASKIN, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1990年 / 51卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(90)90058-R

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The "perfect Folk Theorem" for discounted repeated games establishes that the sets of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs are equal in the limit as the discount factor δ tends to one. We provide conditions under which the two sets coincide before the limit is reached. That is, we show how to compute δ such that the Nash and perfect equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted game are identical for all δ>δ. © 1990.

引用

页码：194 / 206

页数：13

共 5 条

[1] EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES [J].