REPUTATION ACQUISITION IN DEBT MARKETS

[1] SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) : 179 - 221

[2] FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 393 - 414

[3] DIAMOND DW, 1986, UNPUB REPUTATION ACQ

[4] DIAMOND DW, 1988, MONITORING REPUTATIO

[5] DYBVIG P, 1980, UNPUB DOES IT PAY MA

[6] Fama E. F., 1972, THEORY FINANCE

[7] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) : 288 - 307

[8] AN EXPOSITORY NOTE ON INDIVIDUAL RISK WITHOUT AGGREGATE UNCERTAINTY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1985, 35 (01) : 26 - 32

[9] INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE DEBT CONTRACTS - THE ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (04) : 647 - 663

[10] PERFECT SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 97 - 119

[1] SIGNALING GAMES AND STABLE EQUILIBRIA [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (02) : 179 - 221

[2] FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 393 - 414

[3] DIAMOND DW, 1986, UNPUB REPUTATION ACQ

[4] DIAMOND DW, 1988, MONITORING REPUTATIO

[5] DYBVIG P, 1980, UNPUB DOES IT PAY MA

[6] Fama E. F., 1972, THEORY FINANCE

[7] AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) : 288 - 307

[8] AN EXPOSITORY NOTE ON INDIVIDUAL RISK WITHOUT AGGREGATE UNCERTAINTY [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1985, 35 (01) : 26 - 32

[9] INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE DEBT CONTRACTS - THE ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (04) : 647 - 663

[10] PERFECT SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 97 - 119