PROPERTY-TAX AUCTION SALES

被引:15
作者
DEBOER, L
CONRAD, J
MCNAMARA, KT
机构
[1] PURDUE UNIV,DEPT AGR ECON,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907
[2] UNIV INDIANAPOLIS,SCH BUSINESS,INDIANAPOLIS,IN
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3146744
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze sales of tax delinquent properties offered at a single property tax auction. Data on 1,073 parcels offered at the 1987 tax sale in Indianapolis are used. The two-stage Heckman selectivity model is used for the estimation. The results indicate that more valuable, developed, residential parcels located outside of the central city are more likely to sell. Higher minimum bids decrease the probability of sale. Parcels offered later in the auction are less likely to sell. The selling price is associated with a property's assessed value, with a negative premium for properties located in the city center.
引用
收藏
页码:72 / 82
页数:11
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