On Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic

被引:12
作者
van Otterloo, Sieuwert [1 ]
Jonker, Geert [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Liverpool, Dept Comp Sci, Liverpool, Merseyside, England
[2] Univ Utrecht, Inst informat & Comp Sci, Utrecht, Netherlands
关键词
alternating time; epistemic; temporal; strategic; logic; model checking;
D O I
10.1016/j.entcs.2004.11.014
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
ATEL is one of the most expressive logics for reasoning about knowledge, time and strategies. Several issues around the interpretation of this logic are still unresolved. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by showing that agents do not have to know a specific strategy for doing something in order to have a capability. Furthermore we claim that agents can possess so-called strategic knowledge that is derived from their knowledge of strategies being played. In order to prove these claims we present an alternative interpretation of ATEL over extensive game forms. For the definition of abilities we use strategy domination, and to deal with strategic knowledge we include strategy profiles in the model. We illustrate the interpretation issues mentioned using several small examples. Furthermore we show how perfect recall and perfect memory can be characterized.
引用
收藏
页码:77 / 92
页数:16
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