The decisions taken at Maastricht have recured to the problems connected with the formation of a single market. These are above all the chronology of the steps in the sphere of monetary policy and the creation of the European monetary union with one currency, unified monetary policy and one central bank or a system of central banks. The paper concentrates upon these problems as they bring about substantial changes in the institutional arrangement of the credit and monetary relations. The author deals with the process and steps leading to the formation of the European economic area and to succesive resignation of autonomy in economic policy in favour of a larger economic unit. The project of the European monetary union, its principles and measures taken with the goal to create a unified monetary system with one currency and a central bank at the top are analysed, issues are presented to the reader to enable him to compare the development of the European Communities with the situation in CSFR and to consider possible inspirations in the course of restructuring and modernization of the banking system in CSFR. The first part of the article deals with problems of a single market in general and with the grounds which have led to the formation of a unified monetary policy in the EC. In the second part the advantages and shortcomings of the project are shown. The thirth part presents the open questions concerning the possibilities of realizing the Maastricht's agreement. As the path to a unified currency, central bank and monetary policy is not embraced without reserve, the member countries of the European Communities should converge still before realizing the unified monetary policy and establishing a central bank. Autonomous economic policy should be applicated only in cases of fixing some elements of the fiscal, price and income policies. In this manner monetary reserve requirements scale down, the law of averages is brought to bear and external shocks will eliminate one another. Necessary financial discipline can be secured by delegating the relevant competences to the Board of central banks.
