A BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：24

作者：

BANKS, JS ^{[1
]}

CALVERT, RL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ROCHESTER,DEPT CORP RES & DEV,ROCHESTER,NY 14627

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1992年 / 4卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information presents two different efficiency problems: coordination, and maximizing ex ante expected utility by favoring a player facing high stakes. Communication and mediation can allow an optimal tradeoff between the two problems. This paper gives (1) necessary conditions for (and specification of) an incentive-efficient mediation mechanism and (2) necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation to be required for efficiency. These conditions yield additional results concerning the necessity of privacy in communications and the superfluity of enforcement. Contrary to some recent studies, our results demonstrate that unmediated communication is insufficient to achieve incentive efficiency. An application to the theory of regulation is suggested. © 1992.

引用

页码：347 / 372

页数：26

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