OPTIMAL COMMITMENT IN MONETARY-POLICY - CREDIBILITY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY

[1] Bach S., 1989, JL POL, V5, P725

[2] BADE R, 1985, UNPUB CENTRAL BANK L

[3] BANAIAN, 1986, CENTRAL BANKERS BURE, P199

[4] RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1983, 12 (01) : 101 - 121

[5] REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (01) : 3 - 20

[6] POLICY PREFERENCES OF FOMC MEMBERS AS REVEALED BY DISSENTING VOTES [J]. JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1989, 21 (04) : 432 - 441

[7] CANZONERI MB, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P1056

[8] Fisher S., 1977, J POLITICAL EC, V85, P191

[9] A MODEL OF STOCHASTIC-PROCESS SWITCHING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (03) : 537 - 551

[10] FLOOD RP, 1988, NBER2770 WORK PAP

[1] Bach S., 1989, JL POL, V5, P725

[2] BADE R, 1985, UNPUB CENTRAL BANK L

[3] BANAIAN, 1986, CENTRAL BANKERS BURE, P199

[4] RULES, DISCRETION AND REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1983, 12 (01) : 101 - 121

[5] REPUTATION IN A MODEL OF MONETARY-POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (01) : 3 - 20

[6] POLICY PREFERENCES OF FOMC MEMBERS AS REVEALED BY DISSENTING VOTES [J]. JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 1989, 21 (04) : 432 - 441

[7] CANZONERI MB, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P1056

[8] Fisher S., 1977, J POLITICAL EC, V85, P191

[9] A MODEL OF STOCHASTIC-PROCESS SWITCHING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (03) : 537 - 551

[10] FLOOD RP, 1988, NBER2770 WORK PAP