Related party transactions, benefits of control and earnings quality

被引:4
作者
Tong Yan [1 ]
Wang, Huacheng [2 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
related party transactions; benefits of control; earnings quality; controlling shareholders;
D O I
10.1007/s11782-008-0011-x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control (private benefits and shared benefits) via related party transactions, which result in different levels of earnings quality. Using data from all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in the year 2001 and 2002, we found that when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions, giving rise to deterioration in earnings quality. By comparison, when the share ratio is more than 50%, controlling shareholders prefer pursing shared benefits of control through related party transactions, which improve earnings quality as a result.
引用
收藏
页码:187 / 203
页数:17
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