ENTRY INTO THE MARKET FOR LARGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

被引：19
作者：
KLEPPER, G [1 ]
机构：
[1] INST WORLD ECON,W-2300 KIEL 1,GERMANY
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 34卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0014-2921(90)90057-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
European governments have been accused of unfair trading practices in providing subsidies for market entry in the large commercial aircraft industry. A capacity game is calibrated for 1987 to 2006, showing that the disadvantage of late entry is overcome only after a long time. Hence, market entry is unlikely without government subsidies. The scale and scope effects of production outweigh the output-reducing effects of a monopoly. Government supported market entry as an anti-monopoly policy yields higher consumer welfare. Overall welfare is lower due to large losses in producer surplus. © 1990.
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页码：775 / 798
页数：24
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