Venture Capitalists Versus Angels: The Dynamics of Private Firm Financing Contracts

被引:48
作者
Chemmanur, Thomas J. [1 ]
Chen, Zhaohui [2 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, Carroll Sch Management, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] Univ Virginia, McIntire Sch Commerce, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rcfs/cfu009
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
An entrepreneur, with private information about his firm, contracts over two periods with an outside financier, a venture capitalist (VC) or angel. The financier can reduce his information disadvantage by learning about the firm over time. VC financing is scarce relative to angel financing. Further, unlike an angel, a VC may exert effort, which, together with the entrepreneur's effort, increases the firm's success probability. The equilibrium VC financing contract ensures optimal effort-exertion by both entrepreneur and VC. We characterize the firm's equilibrium choice between VC and angel financing, its equilibrium contractual provisions, and the dynamic evolution of its financing contract.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 86
页数:48
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