Is rationality normative?

被引:37
作者
Broome, John [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Corpus Christi Coll, Oxford 0X1 4JF, England
来源
DISPUTATIO-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2007年 / 2卷 / 23期
关键词
D O I
10.2478/disp-2007-0008
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer 'yes'. I consider the idea that rationality is normative for instrumental reasons, because it helps you to achieve some of the things you ought to achieve. I also consider the idea that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. I reject both.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 178
页数:18
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