Is sounds questionable to present, as usual, the relation between positive law and natural law as if they belonged to different realms. Legal Positivism had to acknowledge the changing scenario brought about by the post-war ouastiwtional framing, whirl blurted the stringent limits between law and morals, and gave room to a so-called 'inclusive Positivism. From Jusnaturalism as well, the famous positivistic statement, according to which only positive law is law, would inevitably arise, giving room to an "inclusive" version, laws contra nature would not cease to be laws, even though denaturalised (what, besides immoral, renders them juridically defective). Jusnaturalism is not to offer na alternative legality, but questions legalism as a parady of the legal Actually, the borderline between Positivism and Jusnaturalism will depend upon the former's refusal of an ethic cognitivism, incompatible with today's constitutional framing; and the lauer's claim to an objective juridical reality as the only capable of laying the foundations of its fundamental rights. The path to an approach demands a rehabilitation of practical philosophy, which questions an exhaustive juridical normativism to recognise the pre-eminent place that belongs to principles. And, as a solution, a "demiurgical doubt" striving to devise merely procedural foundations will not suffice.