THE FAIR WAGE-EFFORT HYPOTHESIS AND UNEMPLOYMENT

被引：898
作者：
AKERLOF, GA
YELLEN, YL
机构：
[1] University of California, Berkeley
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 105卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2937787
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper introduces the fair wage-effort hypothesis and explores its implications. This hypothesis is motivated by equity theory in social psychology and social exchange theory in sociology. According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers proportionately withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short of their fair wage. Such behavior causes unemployment and is also consistent with observed cross-section wage differentials and unemployment patterns. © 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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页码：255 / 283
页数：29
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