EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：336

作者：

HOLMSTROM, B ^{[1
]}

MYERSON, RB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1983年 / 51卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912117

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1799 / 1819

页数：21

共 17 条

[1] AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J].

AUMANN, RJ .

ANNALS OF STATISTICS, 1976, 4 (06) :1236-1239

[2] THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST [J].

COASE, RH .

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) :1-44

[3] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J].

DASGUPTA, P ;

HAMMOND, P ;

MASKIN, E .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) :185-216

[4] MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J].

GIBBARD, A .

ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) :587-601

[5] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

TOWNSEND, RM .

ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) :33-64

[6]

Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[7] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].

HARSANYI, JC .

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) :320-334

[8]

HARSANYI JC, 1967, MANAGEMENT SCI, V14, P481

[9]

Holmstrom Bengt, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U

[10] EQUILIBRIUM CONTRACTS FOR SYNDICATES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION [J].

KOBAYASHI, T .

ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) :1635-1665

← 1 2 →