THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY

被引:13
作者
Beal, Sylvain [1 ]
Ghintran, Amandine [2 ]
Remila, Eric [3 ]
Solal, Philippe [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Franche Comte, 30 Ave Observ, F-25009 Besancon, France
[2] Univ Lille 3, EQUIPPE, Domaine Univ Pont Bois BP 59653, F-59653 Villeneuve Dascq, France
[3] Univ Lyon 1, CNRS ENS Lyon, LIP, 46 Allee Italie, F-69364 Lyon 07, France
[4] Univ St Etienne, 06 Rue Basse Rives, F-2403 Saint Etienne, France
关键词
Core; externalities; graph games; marginal vectors; river sharing problem;
D O I
10.1142/S0219198913400161
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453-462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 31 条
  • [1] Sharing a river
    Ambec, S
    Sprumont, Y
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, 107 (02) : 453 - 462
  • [2] Ambec S., 2000, 06 U LAV REC EN
  • [3] Sharing a river among satiable agents
    Ambec, Stefan
    Ehlers, Lars
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2008, 64 (01) : 35 - 50
  • [4] [Anonymous], [No title captured]
  • [5] Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
    Ansink, Erik
    Weikard, Hans-Peter
    [J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2012, 38 (02) : 187 - 210
  • [6] Beal S., 2012, 37346 MPRA U LIB MUN
  • [7] Weighted component fairness for forest games
    Beal, Sylvain
    Remila, Eric
    Solal, Philippe
    [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2012, 64 (02) : 144 - 151
  • [8] Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
    Beal, Sylvain
    Remila, Eric
    Solal, Philippe
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2010, 203 (02) : 404 - 408
  • [9] Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory
    Carraro, Carlo
    Marchiori, Carmen
    Sgobbi, Alessandra
    [J]. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2007, 12 : 329 - 349
  • [10] On group stability in hierarchies and networks
    Demange, G
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2004, 112 (04) : 754 - 778