THE CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM AND ITS AFTERMATH - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

Game-theoretic analysis of public policy has followed a prescriptive rather than descriptive path, thereby raising questions about its practical relevance. One way to rectify this divergence is to operationalize solution concepts from game theory, in order to permit comparison with observed instances of social choice. The purpose of the present study is to examine an intrinsically interesting phase of energy policy, the Canadian National Energy Program (NEP) and its year-long aftermath, in those terms. First, the game-theoretic setting will be described, referring to the phase of intergovernmental confrontation in Canada over the NEP from October 1980 to September 1981. Second, relevant solution concepts for this bargaining game will be identified. Measurements are to be derived for these concepts in the third stage. In the fourth phase, the values generated by the game-theoretic solutions will be compared to the pay-off distribution corresponding to the Canada-Alberta Agreement of September 1981. Finally, implications of the findings will be explored, along with possibilities for further research. -from Author