The Grounds of Necessity

被引:15
作者
Cameron, Ross P. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leeds, Dept Philosophy, Leeds LS2 9JT, England
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00296.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary and the contingent to be a matter of convention.
引用
收藏
页码:348 / 358
页数:11
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