This paper addresses the importance of the distribution of agenda and veto powers among citizens and the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary powers in order to allow the implementation of pro-market reforms in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. In comparative perspective, the paper deals with the issues of constitutional flexibility, law formation dynamics and the presence or absence of judicial review. The main hypothesis in this paper is that the harder it is for the Constitution to be altered, the harder it is to design the political game to implement reforms. The reforms of the social security systems implemented in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay exemplified our analysis.
机构:
Univ Fed Parana, Diritto Costituz & Diritto Elettorale, Curitiba, Parana, BrazilUniv Fed Parana, Diritto Costituz & Diritto Elettorale, Curitiba, Parana, Brazil
Salgado, Eneida Desiree
das Chagas, Carolina Alves
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机构:
Univ Fed Parana, Curitiba, Parana, BrazilUniv Fed Parana, Diritto Costituz & Diritto Elettorale, Curitiba, Parana, Brazil