'Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?

被引：12

作者：

Melnyk, Andrew ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Missouri Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY COMPASS | 2008年 / 3卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00184.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.

引用

页码：1281 / 1296

页数：16

共 33 条

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