LOGICAL CONDUCTISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE Plea in support of the first person

被引：0

作者：

Gensollen, Mario ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Autonoma Aguascalientes, Dept Filosofia, Aguascalientes, Mexico

来源：

TOPICOS-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA | 2006年 / 31期

关键词：

self-knowledge; logical conductism; Gilbert Ryle; Stanley Cavell; Ludwig Wittgenstein;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This article analyzes the problem of self-knowledge through two opposite postures: cartesian dualism and logical conductism. Is self-knowledge infallible, as Descartes thought? Or, rather, self-knowledge is only possible on third person's perspective? The goal is to show that the problem of self-knowledge only can be solved from the outside of a epistemological perspective.

引用

页码：103 / 134

页数：32