FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED ENTRY IN A GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：83
作者：
BENOIT, JP
机构：
来源：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1984年 / 15卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2555520
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：490 / 499
页数：10
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