Public Law and Private Power: The Comparative Political Economy of Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Finance Capitalism

被引:0
作者
Kogut, Bruce [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
corporate governance; political economy; France; Germany;
D O I
10.1057/fp.2011.14
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Corporate governance reform has been a cri de coeur for two decades now. Starting with the advocacy of the liberal market model, proponents of reform have changed, sometimes radically so, their beliefs. Three recent books that examine this history arrive at distinctive interpretations why countries did not converge on the liberal market model. For Culpepper, this means the back rooms, where lobbyists and legislators hammer out future regulations. For Cioffi, the rooms are less sinister, but populated by experts who are skilled but hardly naive technicians. Goyer prefers a more oxygenated realm of analysis whereby actors are constrained less by the making of law and regulations than by institutions. The merits of these distinctive contributions are compared through an analysis of the takeover of the German firm Mannesmann by the UK-based Vodafone.
引用
收藏
页码:404 / 412
页数:9
相关论文
empty
未找到相关数据