MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL

被引：217
作者：
MYERSON, RB [1 ]
机构：
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1983年 / 51卷 / 06期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1912116
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：1767 / 1797
页数：31
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