Cooperation in a common pool resource game: Strategic behavior and a sense of intimacy
被引:0
作者:
Kumakawa, Takehisa
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Nagoya Inst Technol, Creat Engn Educ Ctr, Showa Ku, Gokiso Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4668555, JapanNagoya Inst Technol, Creat Engn Educ Ctr, Showa Ku, Gokiso Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4668555, Japan
Kumakawa, Takehisa
[1
]
机构:
[1] Nagoya Inst Technol, Creat Engn Educ Ctr, Showa Ku, Gokiso Cho, Nagoya, Aichi 4668555, Japan
来源:
COGENT ECONOMICS & FINANCE
|
2018年
/
6卷
/
01期
基金:
日本学术振兴会;
关键词:
common pool resources;
cooperation;
strategic behavior;
sense of intimacy;
D O I:
10.1080/23322039.2018.1446654
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This study experimentally investigates two possible reasons for cooperative investment decisions in common pool resource games with two players. One reason is strategic behavior: subjects, who are allowed to interact with their partners repeatedly, attempt to build a long-term relationship and elicit cooperation from their partners. Another reason is a sense of intimacy: as the pairings of subjects are fixed throughout the experiment, subjects develop a sense of intimacy with their partners and make decisions by considering their benefit. The results suggest that cooperative decisions can be explained almost solely by subjects' strategic behaviors; however, the hypothesis that a sense of intimacy governed cooperative investment was not supported.