Losing the Person: A Metaphysical Foundation Versus a Convincing Philosophical Anthropology

被引：3

作者：

Martin, Jack ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Burnaby, BC, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY | 2014年 / 34卷 / 03期

关键词：

process metaphysics; philosophical anthropology; personhood; agency; hermeneutics;

D O I：

10.1037/a0034955

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

What follows is a response to Fiona Hibberd's (2014, pp. 161-186) "The Metaphysical Basis of a Process Psychology." There is nothing necessarily wrong with insisting that everything in the world conforms to the same foundational metaphysics. However, the manner in which this insistence is played out by Fiona Hibberd leaves little room for a clear conceptualization and treatment of " the person acting in worldly context" as a focus of psychological inquiry. A comparison of Hibberd's metaphysics to Peter Hacker's philosophical anthropology of the person illuminates the shortcomings of the former.

引用

页码：200 / 204

页数：5

共 6 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1999, REENVISIONING PSYCHO

[2]

Bennett M.R., 2003, PHILOS FDN NEUROSCIE

[3]

Hacker PMS, 2007, HUMAN NATURE: THE CATEGORIAL FRAMEWORK, P1, DOI 10.1002/9780470692165

[4] The Metaphysical Basis of a Process Psychology [J].

Hibberd, Fiona J. .

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2014, 34 (03) :161-186

[5]

Martin J, 2010, PERSONS: UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGICAL SELFHOOD AND AGENCY, P155, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_10

[6]

Taylor C., 1985, HUMAN AGENCY LANGUAG, V1, P45

← 1 →