Collective Choice, Governance and Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Analysis of Commons

被引：0
作者：
Herscovici, Alain [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Fed Espirito Santo UFS, Paris, France
来源：
EPTIC | 2011年 / 13卷 / 02期
关键词：
Property Rights; Commons; Governance; Social Welfare;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
From an approach related to the "old instituionalism", and to the analytical tools built by Williamson and Ostrom, this paper aims to analyze the implications of the development of different systems of collective Property Rights and of Commons. I will specify the different elements necessary to built a function of collective welfare, and I will show why, the overnance based on private negotiation is not systematically the most efficient mechanism, in terms of social welfare.
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页数：14
相关论文
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