OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MANY AGENTS

被引：229
作者：
MOOKHERJEE, D
机构：
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1984年 / 51卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2297432
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：433 / 446
页数：14
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