TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL-HISTORY

被引：2795

作者：

BERG, J ^{[1
]}

DICKHAUT, J ^{[1
]}

MCCABE, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,DEPT ACCOUNTING,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1995.1027

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. This design controls for alternative explanations of behavior including repeat game reputation effects, contractual precommitments, and punishment threats. Observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart. A second treatment, social history, identifies conditions which strengthen the relationship between trust and reciprocity. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：122 / 142

页数：21

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