Timing is Everything - The Labour Market Effects of Union Wage Bargaining

被引:0
|
作者
Lingens, Joerg [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Muenster WWU, Munster, Germany
来源
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2007年 / 10卷
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyses the labour market effects of union wage bargaining for different sequences of the employment choice and the wage bargain. The result that collective bargaining decreases (firm-level) employment in a right-to-manage setting hinges on the assumption that employment is chosen by the firm after the wage bargain ("exante" bargaining). Turning this sequence upside down ("ex-post" bargaining), the firm uses employment choice as a strategic variable for the wage bargain. Employment will be equal to the competitive case and wages will be higher. Although we strictly assume right-tomanage, the timing of the bargain ensures an efficient contract.
引用
收藏
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条