Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

被引：8

作者：

Chen, Donghua ^{[1
]}

Liang, Shangkun ^{[1
]}

Zhu, Pin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Nanjing Univ, Sch Business, Inst Accounting & Finance, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China

来源：

CHINA JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2012年 / 5卷 / 02期

关键词：

Relative performance evaluation (RPE); Top managers' compensation; Non-SOEs; SOEs;

D O I：

10.1016/j.cjar.2012.02.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque's (2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation, various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs. (C) 2012 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：127 / 144

页数：18

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