POLITICIANS, INTEREST-GROUPS, AND REGULATORS - A MULTIPLE-PRINCIPALS AGENCY THEORY OF REGULATION, OR LET THEM BE BRIBED

被引：119
作者：
SPILLER, PT [1 ]
机构：
[1] HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
来源：
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 33卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/467200
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：65 / 101
页数：37
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