NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS IN TRANSFERABLE DISCHARGE PERMIT MARKETS - SOME EXTENSIONS

被引:51
作者
KEELER, AG
机构
[1] Department of Agricultural Economics, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0095-0696(91)90041-G
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper extends the results of previous research on transferable discharge permit (TDP) markets with noncompliant firms to make a specific comparison between standards and TDP systems when regulatory authorities are unable to achieve full compliance. Particular attention is given to the importance of the shape of the penalty function facing noncompliant firms. The analysis indicates that under plausible penalty functions TDP markets may allow more pollution or a higher fraction of regulated firms out of compliance. These results highlight the importance of implementation in the success of pollution control strategies relying on TDP markets. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:180 / 189
页数:10
相关论文
共 8 条
[2]   ENFORCEMENT LEVERAGE WHEN PENALTIES ARE RESTRICTED [J].
HARRINGTON, W .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1988, 37 (01) :29-53
[3]   STANDARD SETTING WITH INCOMPLETE ENFORCEMENT REVISITED [J].
JONES, CA .
JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, 1989, 8 (01) :72-87
[4]  
MALIK A, 1984, THESIS J HOPKINS U B
[5]   MARKETS FOR POLLUTION-CONTROL WHEN FIRMS ARE NONCOMPLIANT [J].
MALIK, AS .
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 1990, 18 (02) :97-106
[6]  
Russell Clifford S., 1986, ENFORCING POLLUTION
[7]  
*US EPA, 1987, ENV LAW REP ADM MAT
[8]  
VISCUSI WK, 1979, PUBLIC POLICY, V27, P437