FINITELY REPEATED GAMES

被引：210

作者：

BENOIT, JP ^{[1
]}

KRISHNA, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1912660

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：905 / 922

页数：18

共 15 条

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[7] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE
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[8] Radner R., 1980, J ECON THEORY, V22, P289
[9] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION
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[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1979, 21 (01) : 1 - 9
[10] RUBINSTEIN A, 1977, 25 HEBR U CTR RES MA