Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, Credit Constraints, and Migration

被引：16

作者：

Angelucci, Manuela ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Dept Econ, 364 Lorch Hall,611 Tappan St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

LABOUR-ENGLAND | 2012年 / 26卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00534.x

中图分类号：

F24 [劳动经济];

学科分类号：

020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper models the effect of anti-poverty conditional cash transfer programs on labor migration. Their effect on migration depends on both the size and type of transfers. Conditional transfers, where the potential recipient has to comply with some requirement in order to qualify for eligibility, may decrease contemporaneous migration for some households, but increase future migration for others. In contrast, unconditional grants may increase current migration.

引用

页码：124 / 136

页数：13

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