Constitutional Change in Federations-A Framework for Analysis

被引:18
作者
Benz, Arthur [1 ]
Colino, Cesar [2 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Darmstadt, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany
[2] Natl Distance Learning Univ UNED, Madrid, Spain
关键词
Constitutional change; comparative federalism; federal dynamics; reform; institutional change;
D O I
10.1080/13597566.2011.578886
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article outlines a conceptual framework for analysing constitutional change in federal systems. It begins by explaining the dilemmas, tensions and dynamics inherent in federations that cause the need for adaptation and formal reform of constitutions. After reviewing some approaches and concepts from the literature, the article introduces a conceptual framework for understanding constitutional federal change. It tackles its complexity by determining its modes, mechanisms and outcomes. First, it proposes an analytical distinction among four types of constitutional federal change-reform, innovation, evolution and adjustment-and presents a distinction among four mechanisms of change, distinguishing change produced through constitutional policy making, 'implicit' change of intergovernmental rules and patterns of governance practices, intergovernmental competition and/or 'paradigmatic' shifts in constitutional ideas and values, or change in court decisions and legal interpretation and discourses. It also deals with several typical outcomes of federal change. Finally, some implications for further research are examined.
引用
收藏
页码:381 / 406
页数:26
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