REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS, SIGNALING, AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES

被引：102

作者：

VERMAELEN, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] EUROPEAN INST ADV STUDIES MANAGEMENT,BRUSSELS,BELGIUM

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 1984年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2330896

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：163 / 181

页数：19

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