PUBLIC SIGNALS AND THE EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION

被引:42
作者
LUNDHOLM, RJ
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D O I
10.2307/2491052
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
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页码:322 / 349
页数:28
相关论文
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