2 REMARKS ON THE EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL MERGER

被引:37
作者
CHEUNG, FK
机构
[1] University of Missouri, Columbia, MO
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(92)90254-V
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We describe two simple results in equilibrium analysis of horizontal merger in Cournot industry. The first has to do with welfare-enhancing conditions of output-reducing merger and the second describes the limited abilities of Cournot firms in exploiting market power profitably through horizontal merger.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 123
页数:5
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