A DOMINANT STRATEGY DOUBLE AUCTION

被引：372

作者：

MCAFEE, RP

机构：

[1] University of Texas, Austin

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1992年 / 56卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-U

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the 1 n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices. © 1992.

引用

页码：434 / 450

页数：17

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