A DOMINANT STRATEGY DOUBLE AUCTION

被引:372
作者
MCAFEE, RP
机构
[1] University of Texas, Austin
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-U
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the 1 n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices. © 1992.
引用
收藏
页码:434 / 450
页数:17
相关论文
共 10 条