The power of reason in international negotiations: notes on Risse, Muller, and Deitelhoff

The argumentative turn in policy analysis in general and the theory of communicative action of Jurgen Habermas in particular have inspired scholars of international relations to develop an alternative analysis of negotiation processes. According to these scholars, a logic of arguing and persuasion is predominant in those negotiations that establish new regimes and foster the acceptance of 'universal' norms. In this article I scrutinize their theoretical assumptions and some of their empirical findings. My main criticism is that these research designs tend to neglect the role of power in international negotiations insofar as they try to prove the correspondence between normative theory and political reality. Rather, there are two ways in which power comes in. First, even 'islands of persuasion' cannot completely escape the realities of international relations. Second, the negotiation processes themselves are marked by power that can be analyzed using Foucault's concept of governmentality.