ELECTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY CYCLES

被引:781
作者
ROGOFF, K
SIBERT, A
机构
[1] UNIV KANSAS,LAWRENCE,KS 66045
[2] FED RESERVE SYST,BOARD GOVERNORS,DIV INT FINANCE,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297526
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 16
页数:16
相关论文
共 26 条
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