INFORMATION-PROCESSING AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY - A SURVEY

被引:61
作者
LIPMAN, BL
机构
来源
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1995年 / 28卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/136022
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper surveys recent attempts to formulate a plausible and tractable model of bounded rationality. I focus in particular on models that view bounded rationality as stemming from limited information processing. I discuss partitional models (such as computability, automata, perceptrons, and optimal networks), non-partitional models, and axiomatic approaches.
引用
收藏
页码:42 / 67
页数:26
相关论文
共 78 条
[1]   THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA [J].
ABREU, D ;
RUBINSTEIN, A .
ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (06) :1259-1281
[2]  
ANDERLINI L, COMMUNICATION COMPUT
[3]  
ANDERLINI L, 1992, INCOMPLETE WRITTEN C
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1976, METHOD APPRAISAL EC
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2013, GAME THEORY, DOI DOI 10.2307/J.CTVJSF522
[6]  
Aumann R, 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M
[7]   CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].
AUMANN, RJ .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) :1-18
[8]   AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J].
AUMANN, RJ .
ANNALS OF STATISTICS, 1976, 4 (06) :1236-1239
[9]  
AUMANN RJ, 1991, EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS
[10]   SOME EXTENSIONS OF A CLAIM OF AUMANN IN AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE [J].
BACHARACH, M .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1985, 37 (01) :167-190