PRICE AND QUALITY IN A NEW PRODUCT MONOPOLY

被引:64
作者
JUDD, KL [1 ]
RIORDAN, MH [1 ]
机构
[1] BOSTON UNIV,BOSTON,MA 02215
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297918
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a signal-extraction model of consumer behaviour, higher prices signal higher-quality products for a new product monopoly, even without cost asymmetries across different qualities. Moreover, higher-quality products earn greater expected profits, and the monopolist has an incentive to provide even transient improvements in quality. Finally, the monopolist has a positive incentive to conduct market research about quality, and produces more information than is socially optimal.
引用
收藏
页码:773 / 789
页数:17
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