DELAYED PAYMENT CONTRACTS AND A FIRMS PROPENSITY TO HIRE OLDER WORKERS

[1] INVESTMENT IN HUMAN-CAPITAL - A THEORETICAL-ANALYSIS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1962, 70 (05) : 9 - 49

[2] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[3] BLINDER A, 1980, EMPIRICAL STUDY EFFE

[4] BLINDER AS, 1983, WS WOYTINSKY LECTURE, V5

[5] FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN-CAPITAL AND PROMOTION LADDERS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 251 - 258

[6] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284

[7] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606

[8] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[9] ARE THOSE PAID MORE REALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE - THE CASE OF EXPERIENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1981, 16 (02) : 186 - 216

[10] LABOR AS A QUASI-FIXED FACTOR [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1962, 70 (06) : 538 - 555

[1] INVESTMENT IN HUMAN-CAPITAL - A THEORETICAL-ANALYSIS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1962, 70 (05) : 9 - 49

[2] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18

[3] BLINDER A, 1980, EMPIRICAL STUDY EFFE

[4] BLINDER AS, 1983, WS WOYTINSKY LECTURE, V5

[5] FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN-CAPITAL AND PROMOTION LADDERS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 251 - 258

[6] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284

[7] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606

[8] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[9] ARE THOSE PAID MORE REALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE - THE CASE OF EXPERIENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1981, 16 (02) : 186 - 216

[10] LABOR AS A QUASI-FIXED FACTOR [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1962, 70 (06) : 538 - 555