CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION IN MODELS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引：44

作者：

DEWATRIPONT, M ^{[1
]}

MASKIN, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 34卷 / 2-3期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0014-2921(90)90103-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

收藏

页码：311 / 321

页数：11

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