Rationalizing child-support decisions

被引:0
作者
DelBoca, D [1 ]
Flinn, CJ [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU,DEPT ECON,NEW YORK,NY 10003
关键词
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中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a framework within which the child-support compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and the child-support awards set by institutional agents can be coherently interpreted. The model of child-support transfers is able to capture qualitatively the features of the monthly payment distribution, Estimated parental-decision rules ave used to infer the implicit weights given by institutional agents to the postdivorce welfare of parents and children, We find that the weight attached to the combined welfare of the custodial mother and child is significantly less than the weight given to the father's welfare in most sample cases.
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页码:1241 / 1262
页数:22
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