Dworkin's Theory of Law

被引：3

作者：

Smith, Dale ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Monash Univ, Fac Law, Wellington Rd, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia

来源：

PHILOSOPHY COMPASS | 2007年 / 2卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00058.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Ronald Dworkin is one of the most important, and one of the most controversial, contemporary legal philosophers. This article elucidates the main aspects of Dworkin's theory of law, discussing both his key criticisms of legal positivism and his own positive views about law. The article also briefly examines some of the major controversies surrounding Dworkin's theory of law, such as the debates arising out of his right answer thesis and semantic sting argument.

引用

页码：267 / 275

页数：9

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