THEORIES OF TRUTH AND TRUTH-VALUE GAPS

被引：0

作者：

HUGLY, P

SAYWARD, C

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 68588-0321, NE

来源：

LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY | 1993年 / 16卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00985433

中图分类号：

H0 [语言学];

学科分类号：

030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;

摘要：

The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson's definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible. © 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：551 / 559

页数：9