THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM

被引：247
作者：
ROTH, AE
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1985年 / 36卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
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页码：277 / 288
页数：12
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